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Studies  comparing  neural  correlates  of  reward  processing  across  development  yield  incon-
sistent  ﬁndings.  This  challenges  theories  characterizing  adolescents  as globally  hypo-  or
hypersensitive  to  rewards.  Developmental  differences  in  reward  sensitivity  may  ﬂuctu-
ate based  on  reward  magnitude,  and  on  whether  rewards  require  decision-making.  We
examined  whether  these  factors  modulate  developmental  differences  in neural  response
during reward  anticipation  and/or  receipt  in 26  adolescents  (14.05  ±  2.37 yrs)  and 26  adults
(31.25 ± 8.23  yrs).  Brain  activity  was  assessed  with  fMRI  during  reward  anticipation,  when
subjects made  responses  with–vs.–without  decision-making,  to  obtain  large–vs.–small
rewards,  and during  reward  receipt.  When  reward-receipt  required  decision-making,
neural  activity  did  not  differ  by age. However,  when  reward  receipt  did  not  require  decision-
making, neural  activity  varied  by  development,  reward  magnitude,  and  stage  of  the  reward
task.  During  anticipation,  adolescents,  but  not  adults,  exhibited  greater  activity  in the
insula, extending  into  putamen,  and  cingulate  gyrus  for large–vs.–small  incentives.  Dur-
ing feedback,  adults,  but  not  adolescents,  exhibited  greater  activity  in the  precuneus  for
large–vs.–small  incentives.  These  data  indicate  that  age-related  differences  in reward  sen-
sitivity  cannot  be characterized  by  global  hypo-  or hyper-responsivity.  Instead,  neural
responding  in  striatum,  prefrontal  cortex  and  precuneus  is  inﬂuenced  by both  situational
demands  and  developmental  factors.  This  suggests  nuanced  maturational  effects  in  adoles-
cent reward  sensitivity.. IntroductionAdolescent risky behavior may  reﬂect immature brain
unction (Ernst and Fudge, 2009). Developmental theo-
ies suggest that such immaturity may  result in global
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reward-related hypo- (e.g., Spear, 2000) or hypersensitivity
(e.g., Ernst and Hardin, 2009; Somerville et al., 2010). How-
ever, inconsistent ﬁndings from imaging studies suggest
more nuanced maturational effects in adolescent reward
sensitivity (Bjork et al., 2010; Ernst and Fudge, 2009; Geier
and Luna, 2009; Geier et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2008). As such,
variability in task design may  contribute to inconsistencies
in existing brain-imaging research on adolescent reward
processing.
One task feature that differs across existing studies
is whether reward receipt depends on a subject’s deci-
sions. Paradigms without decision-making (e.g., Bjork et al.,
Cognitiv438 J.M. Jarcho et al. / Developmental 
2004, 2010; van Leijenhorst et al., 2010b)  require subjects
to execute a pre-speciﬁed response (e.g., press button 1)
to obtain a reward. In paradigms that require decision-
making (e.g., Cohen et al., 2010; Ernst et al., 2005; Eshel
et al., 2007; Forbes et al., 2010; van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010a), subjects must typically choose one of two pos-
sible responses (e.g., choose button 1 or 2). The present
study considers whether such decision-making differen-
tially inﬂuences neural sensitivity to incentive value in
adults and adolescents during both reward anticipation
and receipt. Neuroimaging studies assessing developmen-
tal differences in reward processing utilize paradigms that
differ in their use of decision-making. Thus, it is critical
to test directly if this aspect of task design inﬂuences out-
comes.
While poor decision-making is often viewed as norma-
tive in adolescence, there is little evidence that adolescents
are in fact deﬁcient in the reasoning skills needed to
make sound decisions (Furby and Beyth-Marom, 1992).
For example, adolescents perform as well as adults when
estimating their vulnerability to negative outcomes, or
weighing the costs of risky behavior (for reviews, see
Reyna and Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2007). This suggests
that adolescents possess the skills to make sound decisions,
even if they fail to draw on these skills as consistently as
adults.
Indeed, current developmental theories propose that
adults, relative to adolescents, are more likely to employ
top-down processes, which refer to processes that are
goal-driven, and require considerable attention and
cognitive control. In contrast, adolescents, relative to
adults, are more likely to engage bottom-up processes,
which are processes that are driven by stimulus fea-
tures, such as high salience due to affective content.
This dichotomy likely reﬂects the relative dominance
of saliency-driven over goal-driven behavior in adoles-
cents, despite the integrity of top-down processes in
this age group (e.g., Ernst et al., 2011; Ernst and Fudge,
2009; Smith et al., 2011; Steinberg, 2007). Stimuli acquire
salience by affective, motivational, and attention-based
processes, which are mediated by dorsal anterior cin-
gulate (dACC) and insular cortex (Habas et al., 2009;
Seeley et al., 2007; Sridharan et al., 2008). Top-down pro-
cesses that rely on executive control require engagement
of distinct networks encompassing dorsolateral, dorso-
medial, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (Funahashi,
2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Seeley et al., 2007;
Venkatraman et al., 2009). One prediction that emerges
from these theories is that cues signaling the need for
decision-making necessarily engage top-down processes
and thus minimize developmental differences in the
circuitry engaged. In contrast, when reward-motivated
behavior is executed without explicit engagement of
decision-making, greater developmental disparities are
expected due to greater inﬂuences from stimulus saliency,
and thus incentive value, in adolescents relative to
adults.Decision-making refers to the selection of an option
among a set of alternatives. Any decision-making involves
a number of cognitive processes, such as discrimina-
tive attention, value appraisal, formation of a preference,e Neuroscience 2 (2012) 437– 447
and action execution (Ernst and Paulus, 2005). Even the
most elementary choice, such as the choice between two
simple options (press button 1 or button 2), engages
these cognitive processes. Guessing is another example
of decision-making, where individuals select an option
based primarily on “gut feelings”. In contrast, instrumental
responding, which is guided far less heavily by the man-
ifestation of a preference (e.g., press a button as fast as
possible), requires minimal levels of decision-making. The
cognitive processes engaged by decision-making are exec-
utive functions that rely on prefrontal neural circuitry and
modulate subcortical activity (Elliott et al., 1999; Han  et al.,
2009; Lau et al., 2004). Thus, given our speciﬁc interest in
developmental differences in the neural circuitry mediat-
ing response to incentives, and the inﬂuence of cognitive
control on this response, we examine neural responses to
reward anticipation in both the presence and absence of
simple decision-making.
Importantly, it remains unknown whether develop-
mental differences in reward processing emerge as a
function of decision-making. Developmental studies of
reward processing use experimental paradigms in which
incentives are obtained either with or without decision-
making; no study directly contrasts these two classes of
events. In addition, distinct cognitive processes engaged
during reward anticipation vs. receipt may  modulate age-
speciﬁc effects on decision-making. For instance, on tasks
that require decision-making, there are developmental dif-
ferences in dACC (Eshel et al., 2007; van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010a) and orbitofrontal cortex (Eshel et al., 2007) activa-
tion during reward anticipation, but only in striatal activity
during reward receipt (Ernst et al., 2005; Forbes et al., 2010;
van Leijenhorst et al., 2010a).  Conversely, on tasks that
do not require decision-making, there are developmental
differences in the insular cortex (Bjork et al., 2010) and
striatum (Bjork et al., 2004, 2010) during reward antici-
pation, but no developmental differences during reward
receipt (Bjork et al., 2004, 2010). Finally, reward magni-
tude may  further impact these developmental differences
(Bjork et al., 2004; Galvan et al., 2006; van Leijenhorst
et al., 2010a).  Indeed, few studies investigate develop-
mental differences in neural sensitivity to large and small
incentives, either during reward anticipation or reward
receipt.
The current study addresses a growing need to test
the effect of key task parameters on developmental dif-
ferences in brain function during reward processing. If task
parameters modulate developmental differences in reward
processing, cross-study differences in these parameters
could generate the inconsistent results found among exist-
ing neuroimaging studies. Moreover, much like the existing
inconsistencies in the published literature, direct obser-
vation of such task-related modulation in a single study
would challenge theories attributing global differences in
reward function to adolescents and adults. The current
study compares neural activity in adults and adolescents
while they complete a reward paradigm that manipulates
whether decision-making is required to obtain large and
small incentives (Bar-Haim et al., 2009; Helﬁnstein et al.,
2011). We  predict that, within each stage of reward pro-
cessing, development will modulate neural activity based
J.M. Jarcho et al. / Developmental Cognitive
Table  1
Mean (SD) demographic characteristics for adolescents and adults.
Adolescents Adults
Sex (female/male) 13/13 15/11
Age 14.05 (2.37) 31.25 (8.23)
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n incentive value and on whether decision-making is
equired. For rewards obtained without decision-making,
nd thus with minimal top-down processing, we predict
hat adolescents will exhibit greater activity than adults for
arge, compared with small, incentives in brain regions that
rocess stimulus salience, such as dACC and anterior insula,
s well as in regions sensitive to incentive value, such as
triatum. For rewards obtained with decision-making, we
redict that developmental differences for large, compared
ith small, incentives will be minimized, due to the neces-
ary, overt engagement of top-down processes.
. Materials and methods
.1. Subjects
Informed consent from 38 adults, and assent with
arental consent from 48 adolescents, was obtained prior
o participation in this National Institute of Mental Health
nstitutional Review Board approved study. The current
nalysis included 26 adults and 26 adolescents (Table 1).
 subset of adolescents were excluded for excessive
ead motion (≥3 mm;  N = 13), technical difﬁculties (N = 7),
xcessive signal dropout (N = 2), or having siblings in the
tudy (N = 2). Adolescents excluded based on excessive
otion tended to be younger than those without excessive
otion, but only marginally so (M = 12.43 yrs, SD = 2.84;
 = .07). A subset of adults were excluded for excessive
ead motion (N = 3), technical difﬁculties (N = 3), or exces-
ive signal dropout (N = 6). Subjects had no past or current
istory of psychiatric disorder, as determined by Struc-
ured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (First et al., 2002) in
dults, or Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophre-
ia for School Aged Children (Kaufman et al., 1997) in
dolescents. Groups did not differ by gender, socioe-
onomic status (Hollingshead, 1975), or IQ (Weschler,
999).
.2. Reward processing task
Subjects were told they could win points and earn up to
25 by completing a task designed to assess neural activ-
ty during the anticipation and receipt of rewards (Fig. 1A)
Bar-Haim et al., 2009; Helﬁnstein et al., 2011). Each point
as equivalent to 10¢. To minimize potential develop-
ental differences in monetary valuation, subjects were
ot speciﬁcally informed of the point-to-money conversion
ate. For each trial, subjects were asked to provide the cor-
ect response to a visual cue. After a variable inter-stimulus
nterval, subjects learned whether they received a reward
or their response. Neuroscience 2 (2012) 437– 447 439
2.2.1. Anticipation
Each trial began with an anticipation event (1500 ms),
during which a colored circle (cue) prompted subjects to
provide a button press (1 or 2). Cue color indicated the
type of trial (choice, no-choice, motor), while the cue size
indicated the incentive size of potential reward (small:
3-points, large: 6-points). For no-choice trials, “1” or “2”
appeared within the cue, directing subjects to press the
corresponding button to gain points. For choice trials, “?”
appeared within the cue, prompting subjects to choose
the correct response to gain points. For motor trials, a
blank cue prompted subjects to press any button, with
no opportunity to gain points. Thus, the task included
ﬁve types of anticipation events, reﬂecting choice and no-
choice events with small and large potential rewards, and
a non-rewarded motor event.
2.2.2. Receipt
During receipt events (1000 ms), subjects learned
whether they had obtained a reward, and their total points.
Unbeknownst to subjects, half of their choice responses
were randomly selected to result in reward, and half to
result in omission of reward. No-choice responses, when
performed correctly, always resulted in reward. No-choice
response errors (i.e., subject presses a button other than
the one speciﬁed within the cue) resulted in omission of
reward. Motor trials did not involve a receipt event. The
task therefore included six types of reward receipt events,
reﬂecting receipt of small and large rewards obtained with
or without choice, and omission of small and large rewards
from choice events.
2.2.3. Jitter
Jitter was  introduced via the presentation of a purple
rectangle (1000 ms), which was  an incidental stimulus that
required no response. In rapid-event tasks such as the cur-
rent one, jitter has become a standard approach to account
for the refractory period associated with the hemodynamic
response function (Dale, 1999; Huettel and McCarthy,
2000). Particularly for developmental studies such as this
one, that rely on long, fatiguing tasks, jitter allows for
deconvolution of complex events without adding the time
required for slow-event-related designs. Here, incidental
stimuli, which are often presented during jitter (Dale, 1999;
Huettel and McCarthy, 2000), were identical to those used
with by Tricomi et al. (2004).  These incidental stimuli
occurred randomly throughout the task. A variable num-
ber of incidental stimuli occurred between anticipation
and receipt events (inter-stimulus interval = 0–4000 ms;
0–4 events; M = 2000 ms), and between trials (inter-trial
interval = 0–2000 ms;  0–2 events; M = 1000 ms). Variable-
duration jitter allowed neural response to anticipation
and receipt events to be de-convolved independently. Pre-
sentation of incidental stimuli during jitter more ﬁnely
controls for the visual aspects of other trials, relative to
the “blank” trials or “ﬁxation-crosses” used in some stud-
ies (Tricomi et al., 2004). Here, the overall duration of the
jitter resulted in “null” events being present for approxi-
mately the same amount of time as events of interest. This
ratio increases the ability to detect BOLD signal response
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Fig. 1. Reward task design; results of self-report and behavioral data. (A) Each trial was  comprised of reward anticipation (1500 ms)  and receipt (1000 ms)
stages. During reward anticipation, colored circle cues prompted subjects to respond. Cue color indicated the type of trial (no-choice: orange; choice: blue;
motor: yellow). Size of no-choice and choice trials cues reﬂected incentive size (small: 3-points; large: 6-points). For no-choice trials, a “1” or “2” within
the  cue directed subjects to press the corresponding button to gain points. For choice trials, a “?” within the cue prompted subjects to guess the correct
response to gain points. For motor trials, a small blank cue prompted subjects to press any button, with no opportunity to gain points. During reward
ative sc
lor was
) and chreceipt, subjects learned if their response was rewarded and their cumul
variable-duration jitter into the design, and required no response. Cue co
post-scan affective ratings, and (C) response times, for no-choice (orange
to active events (Birn et al., 2002; Dale and Buckner,
1997).
2.2.4. Task comprehension and presentation
Adolescents and adults practiced, and successfully com-
pleted, several trials of the task prior to entering the
scanner. After practicing, subjects were shown each type of
cue, and were asked to describe the relationship between
their response to each cue and potential reward outcomes.
All subjects accurately reported that responses on no-
choice trials would be rewarded if performed correctly,
choice trials would be rewarded only if they selected the
correct response, and that motor trials would not result in
reward. After the scan was completed, subjects were asked
again to describe the relationship between their response
to each type of cue and reward outcomes, and again were
able to describe this relationship accurately. The fact that
all subjects were able to do this without difﬁculty sug-
gests that the task was developmentally appropriate forore. Incidental stimuli (1000 ms)  were purple rectangles that introduced
 counterbalanced across subjects. Graphs depict average (±SEM) for (B)
oice (blue) trials.
the adolescents in the study. Once in the scanner, sub-
jects completed three runs of 40 randomly presented trials
(trials-per-run: choice = 16, no-choice = 16, motor = 8). This
resulted in 48 choice, 48 no-choice, and 24 motor trials. The
5 anticipation and 6 receipt events yielded 11 trial-speciﬁc
events. Cue color cue was counterbalanced across sub-
jects. The E-Prime (Version 1.1; Psychology Software Tools,
Inc.) program was presented via back-projection. Subjects
responded via a hand-held two-button box (Cedrus Corpo-
ration).
2.3. Self-report measures
Immediately after scanning, subjects rated whether
they thought the reward outcomes of the choice trials were
rigged, or “ﬁxed,” by the experimenter (1–10: Not at all
true–Very true). Subjects then rated their affect toward
each of the 5 cues (1–10: Like–Dislike).
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.4. Imaging data acquisition
Neuroimaging data were acquired with a GE Signa, 3T-
canner (Waukesha, WI). For each subject, 495 functional
mages (165 per-run) with 30 contiguous 4 mm thick
agittal slices (in-plane resolution = 3.75 × 3.75 mm)
ere acquired using a T2*-weighted echo-planar
equence (TR/TE = 2500/23 ms,  ﬂip = 90◦; FOV = 240 mm,
atrix = 64 × 64). To facilitate anatomical localization and
oregistration of functional data, a high-resolution struc-
ural scan was acquired (sagittal plane) with a T1-weighted
agnetization-prepared spoiled gradient-recalled echo
equence (TR/TE = 8100/32 ms,  ﬂip = 15◦; FOV = 240 mm,
atrix = 256 × 256, in-plane resolution, 0.86 × 0.86 mm).
.5. Data analysis
.5.1. Self-report
Independent samples t-tests assessed whether adults
nd adolescents were equally unaware that reward out-
omes for choice trials were computer-determined. A
epeated-measures ANOVA was performed on affective
atings of reward cues, with two within-subject factors
decision-making [no-choice vs. choice]; incentive size
small vs. large]) and one between-subjects factor (age
roup [adult vs. adolescent]).
.5.2. Behavior
Response time was assessed for choice and no-choice
esponses. After removing outliers (i.e., trials with response
ime > M ± 2.5 SDs), a repeated-measures ANOVA was  per-
ormed on response time, with two within-subject factors
decision-making [no-choice vs. choice] and incentive size
small vs. large]) and one between-subjects factor (age
roup [adult vs. adolescent]).
.5.3. Imaging
Analysis of functional and neural images (AFNI; version
.56b); (Cox, 1996) was used to preprocess and analyze
maging data. We  implemented the same analytic path and
xclusionary criteria for motion as prior studies using this
aradigm (Bar-Haim et al., 2009; Helﬁnstein et al., 2011).
unctional data were corrected for slice timing and reg-
stered to the high-resolution structural scan. Functional
ata were smoothed (6 mm  kernel), spatially normalized,
nd resampled, resulting in 3.75 mm3 voxels.
A random-effects analysis was conducted with a two-
evel procedure. Subject-level data were analyzed using
ultiple-regression. Task-speciﬁc regressors modeled
ach of the 5 anticipation events (no-choicesmall, no-
hoicelarge, choicesmall, choicelarge, motor), and each of the
 feedback events (reward: no-choicesmall, no-choicelarge,
hoicesmall, choicelarge; reward omission: choicesmall,
hoicelarge). Although motor anticipation, non-rewarded
hoice events, and the few incorrectly performed no-
hoice events were modeled, they were not included in the
resent analyses. Incidental stimuli, included to introduce
itter, were not modeled.
Task-speciﬁc regressors were convolved with a gamma-
ariate basis function approximating the BOLD response
Cohen, 1997). Additional regressors modeled motion Neuroscience 2 (2012) 437– 447 441
residuals and baseline drift. For each subject, this analy-
sis produced a -coefﬁcient and associated t-statistic for
each voxel and regressor. Percent signal change maps were
generated by dividing signal intensity at each voxel by
the mean voxel intensity for each run, and multiplying by
100.
Group-level analyses tested whether decision-making
(no-choice vs. choice) and incentive size (small vs. large)
moderated age group differences in neural activation
during each processing stage (reward anticipation vs.
receipt). Hypotheses were tested with two  ANOVA models,
which included two within-subjects factors (decision-
making [no-choice vs. choice] and incentive size [small
vs. large]), and one between-subjects factor (age group
[adult vs. adolescent]). One model assessed brain activ-
ity during anticipation. The second model, which assessed
brain activity during receipt, only included reward tri-
als. This was because a primary goal of the study, i.e.,
contrasting activity during choice and no-choice events,
can only be accomplished by comparing rewarded trials,
since no-choice events did not result in reward omission.
This particular analytic strategy was selected to match the
design features of the experiment and the hypotheses that
the study intended to address. This study was  designed
speciﬁcally to assess age-related modulation of the effects
of decision-making and incentive magnitude on brain func-
tion. Thus, we  conducted a 3-way ANOVA with age-group
as the between-subjects factor, and decision-making and
incentive size as the within-subjects factors, and selectively
examined the brain regions that were modulated by the
3-way interaction.
Additional secondary analyses were conducted, beyond
this primary analysis and its focus on a 3-way inter-
action (see Supplementary materials). These secondary
analyses enhanced interpretation and placed the current
ﬁndings in the context of other research. Speciﬁcally, these
analyses contrasted each anticipation event of interest
(no-choicesmall, no-choicelarge, choicesmall, choicelarge) and
each receipt event of interest (reward: no-choicesmall, no-
choicelarge, choicesmall, choicelarge), with implicit baseline,
separately for adolescents and adults. Analyses were per-
formed to conﬁrm that the relatively simple decisions
prompted by choice cues were sufﬁcient to engage brain
regions typically associated with top-down processing. To
do this, across all subjects, anticipation events for choice
(choicesmall + choicelarge) were contrasted with anticipa-
tion events for no-choice (no-choicesmall + no-choicelarge).
Analyses were also performed to test for the effects of
age on decision-making. This was tested with two  ANOVA
models, which included one within-subjects factor of
decision-making (no-choice vs. choice), and one between-
subjects factor of age group (adult vs. adolescent). One
model assessed brain activity during anticipation. The sec-
ond model, which assessed brain activity during receipt,
only included reward trials.
The primary hypotheses were tested with a three-way
interaction in each model. All analyses used a voxel-wise
threshold of p < .005 with a 10-voxel extent threshold. Of
note, this combination of threshold parameters yields a
desirable balance between Type I and Type II error rate
(Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009). In this instance, such
Cognitive Neuroscience 2 (2012) 437– 447
Fig. 2. Reward anticipation. (A) 3-way (age group x decision-making x
incentive size) interaction found in insula extending to putamen, and
dACC (MNI X-plane = 7; Z-plane = −4). Graphs depict this interaction. Bars442 J.M. Jarcho et al. / Developmental 
a balance is important because it allows a thorough explo-
ration of the inﬂuence of complex tasks on brain activity
in regions often excluded from developmental studies of
reward processing. Of note, our study focuses on between-
group differences in higher-order interactions, so balancing
Type I and Type II error rates is essential. For clusters
exhibiting signiﬁcant three-way interactions, subject-level
percent signal-change values were extracted and plotted to
facilitate interpretation.
3. Results
3.1. Self-report
3.1.1. Awareness of computer-determined reward
outcomes
Adults (M = 2.26, SD = 1.60) and adolescents (M = 2.17,
SD = 1.99) were equally unaware that choice outcomes
were computer-determined (t < .5, p = ns).
3.1.2. Affective ratings for reward cues (Fig. 1B)
There was a 3-way (age group × decision-
making × incentive size) interaction for affective ratings
of reward cues (F(1, 44) = 4.44, p < .05). Among adults,
a decision-making × incentive size interaction (F(1,
22) = 13.59, p = .001) revealed that no-choice trials with
large incentives were rated more positively than those
with small incentives (t(22) = 4.69, p < .001). Incentive
size did not inﬂuence adult ratings for choice trials (t < 2,
p = ns). In adolescents, there was no decision-making-by-
incentive size interaction (F < 1, p = ns), nor were there
main effects of decision-making (F < 4, p = ns), or incentive
size (F < 3; p = ns).
3.2. Behavioral response time (Fig. 1C)
The 3-way (age group × decision-making × incentive
size) repeated measures ANOVA for response time was
not signiﬁcant (F < 1, p = ns). Thus, group did not inﬂu-
ence in-scanner behavior. Nevertheless, while response
time did not vary by age group, there was a decision-
making × incentive size interaction (F(1, 50) = 6.25, p < .05),
as well as a main effect of decision-making (F(1,50) = 18.79,
p < .001) and incentive size (F(1, 50) = 4.86, p < .05). This
indicated that regardless of age group, response time was
slower for choice vs. no-choice trials (t(51) = 1.99, p = .05),
and for large vs. small incentives (t(51) = 3.91, p < .001).
However, the large compared with small incentive differ-
ence occurred only for choice (t(51) = 3.02, p < .005) but not
no-choice, trials (t < .50, p = ns). Thus, reaction time varied
as a function of both within-subject task-related parame-
ters.
3.3. Imaging results
3.3.1. Anticipation
(Fig. 2; Table 2A): In four key regions, the 3-way(age group × decision-making × incentive size) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant 3-way interactions
with large effect sizes (partial 2 > 0.1379; Cohen, 1973).
These regions included the right anterior insula extendingrepresent mean (±SEM) percent signal change for large versus small
incentives, during no-choice (orange) and choice (blue) reward antici-
pation in (B) right insula extending to striatum, and (C) right dACC.
into the putamen, left anterior insula, dACC, and mid-
cingulate cortex (all p’s < .005; see Table 2A for partial 2and F-values). In each instance, the three-way interaction
reﬂected a decision-making × incentive size interaction
in adolescents (all p’s < .01; see Table 2A for F-values)
but not adults (all p’s > 10; see Table 2A for F-values).
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Table  2
Activation clusters identiﬁed in 3-way interaction: Age (adult vs. adolescent) ×decision-making (no-choice vs. choice) × incentive size (small vs. large).
Region Peak MNI  coordinates Cluster size Partial 2 Age × decision
× size
Adolescents:
decision × size
Adults:
decision × size
x y z
A. Anticipation F*** F** F§
Insula −37 0 4 12 0.19 11.56 9.47 2.61
34  8 −3 48 0.25 14.36 17.92 0.80
Cingulate −7 22 43 14 0.19 11.63 8.43 3.18
0  −17 40 11 0.18 11.70 7.84 3.50
B.  Receipt F*** F§ F***
Precuneus −37 −68 33 48 0.09 17.86 1.73 12.17
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Fig. 3. Reward receipt. (A) 3-way (Age X Decision-making X Incentive
size) interaction found in precuneus (MNI X-plane = −37). Graph depict
this interaction. Bars represent mean (±SEM) percent signal change for** All p’s < .001.
*** All p’s < .005.
§ All p’s > .10.
n adolescents, the effect of incentive size on neural
esponse was greater during no-choice than choice trials
see Fig. 2). Speciﬁcally, adolescents had greater activity
n these regions for large compared with small incentives
n the no-choice trials (all t’s > 3.30; all p’s < .005), and
xhibited no incentive-related difference on choice trials
all t’s < 1.50; all p’s > .25).
.3.2. Receipt
(Fig. 3; Table 2B): The 3-way (age group × decision-
aking × incentive size) repeated-measures ANOVA
evealed a signiﬁcant 3-way interaction, here with a
edium effect size (partial 2 > 0.0588; Cohen, 1973). This
nteraction emerged only in the left precuneus (p < .005;
ee Table 2B for partial 2 and F-value). In direct con-
rast with the results during anticipation, the three-way
nteraction reﬂected a decision-making × incentive size
nteraction in adults (p < .005; see Table 2B for F-value) but
ot adolescents (p > .10; see Table 2B for F-value). In adults,
he effect of incentive size on neural response was greater
uring no-choice than choice trials (see Fig. 3). Speciﬁcally,
dults had greater activity for large compared with small
ncentives in the no-choice trials (t = 3.01; p < .01), with no
ifference in choice trials (t = −.84, p > .40).
.3.3. Secondary analyses (Supplementary Materials)
Secondary analyses indicate that, when compared with
n implicit baseline, each anticipation event of inter-
st (no-choicesmall, no-choicelarge, choicesmall, choicelarge)
licited extensive activity among adolescents and adults
n regions including striatum, insula, and anterior cingu-
ate (see Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2; Tables 1–8).  In
ddition to this pattern of activation, both adolescents
nd adults exhibited deactivation in medial prefrontal
ortex and posterior cingulate, primarily during choice tri-
ls. Secondary analyses also conﬁrm that, compared with
o-choice events (no-choicesmall + no-choicelarge), choice
vents (choicesmall + choicelarge) during anticipation elicit
xtensive activity in regions typically associated with top-
own processing, including dorsomedial and dorsolateral
refrontal cortex (see Supplementary Fig. 3; Table 9). Dur-
ng anticipation there was no age group × decision-making
nteraction in the brain. During receipt there was an age
roup ×decision-making interaction in inferior parietal
obule (41, -48, 27; 108 voxels).large versus small incentives, during no-choice (orange) and choice (blue)
reward receipt in (B) left precuneus.
4. Discussion
This is the ﬁrst study to show that the need to engage
even simple decision-making processes in order to obtain
rewards differentially inﬂuences neural sensitivity to
incentives in adolescents and adults. These data suggest
that developmental differences in reward processing
Cognitiv444 J.M. Jarcho et al. / Developmental 
are more nuanced than predicted by theories that posit
either global reward-related hypo- (e.g., Spear, 2000) or
hypersensitivity (e.g., Ernst and Hardin, 2009; Somerville
et al., 2010). Instead, these developmental differences
appear dynamic, varying as a function of task features,
particularly the need for decision-making. This dynamic
relationship may  help to explain why inconsistent results
have emerged from neuroimaging studies of reward
processing across development. This suggests researchers
who use neuroimaging to study developmental differ-
ences in reward processing should carefully consider
the precise nature of key task parameters, such as the
need to make choices and the magnitude of the reward
at stake. The current ﬁndings directly demonstrate the
manner in which these task parameters inﬂuence neural
correlates of reward processing. Moreover, the ﬁndings
stimulate a re-evaluation of prior ﬁndings on develop-
mental differences in reward processing. Findings in
prior studies that appear, at ﬁrst glance, to reﬂect global,
development-related differences in reward processing,
may  actually reﬂect particular effects in one or another age
group due to speciﬁc features of one or another reward
task.
Speciﬁc task features are likely to differentially engage
top-down cognitive processes in adolescents and adults,
which in turn modulate developmental differences in sen-
sitivity to incentive value. Behavioral data (subjective
ratings of cues) collected after scanning in the current
study also reveal signs of age-related differences in incen-
tive value. Adults, but not adolescents, rated cues for
large incentives obtained without decision-making more
positively than cues for small incentives. However, nei-
ther adults nor adolescents rated cues for small and
large incentives obtained with decision-making differ-
ently. This further suggests the capacity for task features
to modulate developmental differences in reward-related
processes.
While this relatively simple decision-making task
engaged brain regions associated with top-down cognitive
control, during scanning, no age differences in behavioral
performance (RT) emerged. Therefore, the observed age-
related differences in brain function cannot be attributed
to age-related differences in behavior, thereby remov-
ing so-called “performance confounds” that complicate
many between-group comparisons in brain imaging. More-
over, the presence of comparable task-related variation in
behavior among adolescents and adults demonstrates that
the current task is developmentally appropriate for adoles-
cents.
As hypothesized, we found that neural activity among
adults and adolescents varies depending on whether
rewards are obtained with or without decision-making.
Particularly notable ﬁndings emerge in the insula extend-
ing into putamen and components of the prefrontal cortex,
including dACC, and mid-cingulate cortex. During the
anticipation of rewards obtained either with or without
decision-making, adults exhibit similar levels of neural
activation in these regions for small and large incentives.
Among adolescents, however, neural activity in these brain
regions varies during reward anticipation as a function of
decision-making requirements. These adolescent-limited,e Neuroscience 2 (2012) 437– 447
task-related variations reﬂect enhanced responding specif-
ically for non-decision events, relative to decision events,
when adolescents anticipate large, compared with small,
incentives. These ﬁndings suggest that both reward mag-
nitude and task-related decision-making requirements
differentially inﬂuence the adolescent and adult brain.
Moreover, prior research ﬁnds that activity in the striatum,
anterior insular cortex, dACC and mid-cingulate cortex
varies with changes in stimulus salience (Habas et al., 2009;
Seeley et al., 2007; Sridharan et al., 2008). Considered in
light of the current ﬁndings, this suggests that adoles-
cents may  therefore be more likely to engage bottom-up
saliency-driven, rather than top-down goal-driven, pro-
cesses as they consider large relative to small incentives
under conditions that do not require explicit decision-
making.
Whereas prior reward-based studies report develop-
mental differences in striatal and prefrontal function,
here we also found distinct results in the precuneus
during receipt of rewards that were obtained without
decision-making. While adolescents exhibit similar levels
of neural activation in this region, regardless of incen-
tive size, adults are more responsive to large, compared
with small, rewards. This age-related ﬁnding is interest-
ing in view of the involvement of the parietal cortex in
reward-related behavior (Ernst and Paulus, 2005), particu-
larly in decision-making of uncertain outcomes (Funahashi,
2001; Reyna and Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2007). However,
this was  only a medium size-effect, and clearly requires
replication. Nevertheless, as with reward anticipation, this
ﬁnding highlights the nuanced nature of developmental
differences in reward receipt. If replicated, such ﬁndings
would further suggest that adults and adolescents engage
distinct cognitive and associated neural processes based on
reward-processing stages, decision-making requirements,
and incentive size.
As hypothesized, when rewards are obtained with cues
that explicitly engage decision-making, developmental dif-
ferences in neural response to incentive size are eliminated.
By directly contrasting events with and without decision-
making, these ﬁndings show that, while adolescents have
the capacity to engage similar brain regions as adults,
they may  not do so unless top-down cognitive processes
are activated by situation-based demands, such as the
need for decision-making. In other situations that require
reward-processing, adolescents may  be more likely than
adults to rely on saliency-driven, bottom-up mechanisms
(e.g., Ernst and Fudge, 2009; Smith et al., 2011; Steinberg,
2007). Given these data, it is not surprising that prior neu-
roimaging ﬁndings in developmental reward processing
appear inconsistent. For example, tasks that do not require
decision-making often result in developmental differences
in striatal activity during reward anticipation, but not
receipt (Bjork et al., 2004, 2010; Geier et al., 2010), whereas
tasks with decision-making often ﬁnd the opposite results
(Ernst et al., 2005; Eshel et al., 2007; van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010a). Further inconsistencies may  relate to the failure to
isolate neural response to large and small rewards (Eshel
et al., 2007) as well as processes occurring during reward
anticipation vs. receipt (Galvan et al., 2006; Smith et al.,
2011).
ognitive
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.1. General implications and limitations
The current study has important implications for brain-
maging research on age-related variation in reward
rocessing. This study identiﬁed two parameters, decision-
aking and incentive size, that differentially inﬂuence
evelopmental differences in reward processing. There
ay  be other task-related parameters that have similar or
ven more pronounced effects on outcomes. Such ﬁndings
hallenge theories of global hypo- and hyper-reactivity to
eward among adolescents. Rather, situational factors, such
s the magnitude of a reward or the need to make a choice,
lay an important role in modulating developmental dif-
erences in response to reward.
The current study also bears some broader implica-
ions. Adolescent and adult sensitivity to incentive value
aries based on whether rewards are obtained with or
ithout decision-making. Understanding normative brain
echanisms such as these is critical for deciphering
typical processes in patient populations. For instance,
ecision-making differentially modulates reward function
n typically developing vs. behaviorally inhibited adoles-
ents (Bar-Haim et al., 2009; Helﬁnstein et al., 2011); the
atter are at risk of developing anxiety disorders (Chronis-
uscano et al., 2009). Studies show differences between
hese populations in neural response during reward antici-
ation (Bar-Haim et al., 2009; Guyer et al., 2006) and receipt
Helﬁnstein et al., 2011). Most studies only contrast brain
ctivity in healthy and at-risk or patient populations during
ne form of reward processing. This is because adequately
owered tasks contrasting activity across multiple forms of
eward processing must include multiple factors, forcing
mplementation of long tasks. Yet, psychological deﬁcits
ntrinsic to anxiety and depression may  be particularly sen-
itive to cognitive factors, such as decision-making, that
odulate incentive processing. Identifying these factors
ay  help isolate cognitive strategies that could be used to
eset otherwise dysregulated reward processing.
The study has limitations. For instance, the wide age
ange of subjects may  introduce noise. Thus, more caution
s needed for negative than positive ﬁndings. Despite this
imitation, at least some of the expected between-group
ifferences emerged. Future research should recruit homo-
eneous age groups, which would also permit the study of
uberty effects and other factors operating within adoles-
ence.
The current ﬁndings can only hint at the precise nature
f real-world contexts that elicit greater risk-taking in ado-
escents than adults. This is because real-world contexts
ften differ quite markedly from the contexts of neu-
oscience experiments, where methodological concerns
equire the use of precise restrictions on task design. Thus,
nlike in experimental contexts, where top-down and
ottom-up processes can be manipulated and isolated from
ne another, real-world contexts typically involve com-
lex blends of these two sets of processes. Thus, considered
gainst the complex backdrop of real-world scenarios, the
urrent ﬁndings suggest that it is not the mere require-
ent to engage either top-down or bottom-up processes
hat lead adolescents to behave differently in particular
ontexts, but rather the relative combination of these two Neuroscience 2 (2012) 437– 447 445
processes in different contexts. Speciﬁcally, reward-driven
behaviors among adolescents are expected to manifest
uniquely in contexts where bottom-up, stimulus-driven
aspects of the context heavily inﬂuence behavior, even
though such behavior reﬂects the mutual inﬂuence of
bottom-up and stimulus-driven inﬂuences.
In real-world contexts, the propensity of adolescents
to engage in risky, but rewarding situations, such as drug
use, driving too fast, or unsafe sex, may  be modulated
by decision-making. The current ﬁndings suggest that
such adolescent-speciﬁc behavioral tendencies manifest
in contexts heavily shaped by stimulus-driven features,
presumably due to age-differences in stimulus-driven
engagement of the reward circuitry delineated in the cur-
rent study. A better understanding of how context and
its associated stimulus-driven processing inﬂuence ado-
lescent behavior in such situations could have important
implications for the formulation of interventions aimed at
preventing risk-taking behavior.
Probably the best-studied example of adolescent-
speciﬁc stimulus-driven behavior focuses on risk-taking
while driving. Adolescents face higher risk for trafﬁc acci-
dents than adults (Cvijanovich et al., 2001), and such
accidents are more likely to occur among adolescents who
are driving with peers, relative to those who  are driving
alone (Chen et al., 2000). Work by Steinberg and col-
leagues suggests that the presence of peers more heavily
inﬂuences risk-taking behavior among adolescents than
adults (Steinberg, 2004, 2007, 2008). Considered in light
of the current work, peers can be viewed as a highly
salient stimulus feature of a potentially risky environ-
ment, one that shapes the context of driving by imbuing it
with highly rewarding stimuli. Thus, unlike driving alone,
where behavior can be heavily shaped by top-down, rather
than bottom-up processes, driving with peers imbues a
situation with salient, distracting, bottom-up, stimulus fea-
tures. The presence of peers can “tip the balance” towards
stimulus-driven, bottom-up processes and away from top-
down processes. This contextual feature, in turn, might
lead to the age-related differences in behavior that pre-
sumably relate to neural correlates of the stimulus-driven
differences found in the current work. Taken together, this
current and prior work should encourage researchers to
ﬁnd other instances where stimulus-driven aspects of a
context lead to age-related differences in real-world behav-
iors.
An additional limitation is that probability of reward
receipt co-varied with decision-making, such that 100% of
no-choice trials but only 50% of choice trials led to rewards.
This difference in outcome probability has important
implications for the cognitive processes engaged during
reward anticipation. Indeed, no-choice cues signal both
the absence of decision-making and certain reward receipt,
while choice cues signal both the need for decision-making
and uncertain reward receipt. Thus, differences in neu-
ral response between choice and no-choice cue-conditions
may  reﬂect differences in decision-making and/or the cer-
tainty of the reward outcome. Moreover, the reduced
likelihood of a reward decreases the value of that reward,
which is captured by the computation of expected values
as the product of probability by magnitude of the reward
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(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). As a result, differences
in outcome probability might cause reward magnitude to
become more salient for adolescents. Interpreted in this
way, increased activity in regions such as the cingulate
cortex and anterior insula may  reﬂect that reward mag-
nitude is more salient for adolescents than adults, but only
when those rewards are certain to be obtained. This poten-
tial confound is clearly a serious limitation in the current
design, and is critical to clarify in future work. However, this
issue underscores the need for researchers studying devel-
opmental differences in the neural substrates of reward
processing to consider carefully how small alterations in
experimental parameters can result in different ﬁndings.
Finally, a relatively high rate of motion-related attri-
tion occurred among adolescents in the current study.
There are several factors that may  have contributed to
motion artifacts. The adolescents with excessive motion
artifacts tended to be younger than those without exces-
sive motion. Younger adolescents may  have had a more
difﬁcult time with a long task (∼25 min), which required
them to attend and perform adequately over this relatively
extended period of time. While these task features have
the advantage of maximizing statistical power and gener-
ating important behavioral data, they may  contribute to
a relatively high rate of data loss due to poor task com-
pliance or excessive movement. However, the pattern of
excessive motion was not homogeneous across all subjects.
While some subjects exhibited more pronounced motion
during the ﬁnal run of the experiment, in others motion
was more prominent near the end of each run or through-
out the entire task. This suggests that the relatively long
duration of the task may  have contributed to the exces-
sive motion exhibited by some adolescents, while fatigue
within each run may  have been more problematic for oth-
ers. Adolescents who exhibited motion throughout the task
may  have beneﬁtted from formal motion-limitation train-
ing in a mock scanner prior to the experiment. Despite the
relatively high rate of attrition that we observed, the vast
majority of adolescents were able to successfully complete
the task without excessive motion.
In summary, the current ﬁndings demonstrate that
decision-making differentially inﬂuences neural sensitiv-
ity to incentives in adults and adolescents. The modulatory
effects of decision-making may  contribute to risk-taking
proclivity in adolescence and risk for psychopathology.
Follow-up research is warranted to conﬁrm the present
ﬁndings and delineate the mechanisms underlying these
effects.
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